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Notes and Comments
GUARANTEEING TREATMENT FOR THE COMMITTED
MENTAL PATIENT: THE TROUBLED ENFORCEMENT
OF AN ELUSIVE RIGHT
Americans have been locking up the mentally ill for more than
a century. During the past several decades they have held hearings
before throwing away the keys to the institutions. American society
in the late 1960's turned from the traditional concern for the pro-
cedural aspects of commitment of mentally ill persons to the quality
of treatment received by those confined to public mental hospitals.
The courts followed public opinion behind the institutioual walls.
In 1966, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held, in Rouse v. Cameron,' that a patient committed to a public
mental hospital had a right, protected by statute and possibly consti-
tutionally compelled, to receive adequate treatment for his illness. This
landmark decision touched only the broad principles involved in the
right to treatment, relegating to future cases the intractable problems
of everyday implementation. In the aftermath of Rouse v. Cameron,
a few state and federal courts have struggled, often without success,
not only to formulate workable standards of what constitutes adequate
treatment but also to fashion remedies that will effectively implement
the right to such treatment.2 The judiciary's initial reluctance to enter
the traditional preserve of psychiatrists' appeared to be based on in-
articulate description of the genesis of the right, the absence of easily
applied standards for evaluating treatment, and the difficulty of framing
remedies.4 Confronted with the grim reality of modern mental hospital
life, however, some courts assumed responsibility for trying to move the
right to treatment forward to reality. Five types of commitment to
mental institutions raise questions concerning the right to adequate
1. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
2. The difficulties inherent in developing standards and formulating remedies
have caused many courts to practice a "hands-off" policy. See Comment, Due Process
for All - Constitutional Standards for Involuntary Civil Commitment and Release,
34 U. Cm. L. REv. 633, 642 (1967).
3. Rouse v. Cameron itself illustrates the traditional hands-off approach to treat-
ment of mental hospital patients. When the district court initially denied Rouse's
habeas corpus petition, Judge Holtzoff stated: "My jurisdiction is limited to deter-
mining whether he has recovered his sanity. I don't think I have a right to consider
whether he is getting enough treatment. * * " 373 F.2d at 452 (quoting unpublished
district court opinion).
4. Birnbaum, A Rationale for the Right, 57 GEO. L.J. 77 n.3 (1969).
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treatment: (1) involuntary commitment under a civil commitment
statute ;5 (2) voluntary admission commenced by the patient himself
or by someone acting on his behalf;' (3) mandatory commitment
following an acquittal by reason of insanity ;7 (4) mandatory hospitali-
zation following conviction of a crime ;' and (5) commitment under
defective delinquent,9 sexual psychopath1" and narcotics addiction stat-
utes." The quality of treatment that must be afforded and the power
of the courts to guarantee it are the most important issues still to be
developed in implementing the right to treatment.
I. THE RIGHT To TREATMENT
A. Genesis of the Right
In Rouse v. Cameron,2 a patient involuntarily committed to Saint
Elizabeth's Hospital under a District of Columbia statute filed a habeas
corpus petition claiming that he was being denied adequate treatment
in contravention of his constitutional rights and that he had recovered
his mental health. The committing statute provided that a person
acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity must be confined to a
mental hospital' 3 until the superintendent certified that the patient
had recovered his sanity and was no longer dangerous to others; at
such time, the patient would be entitled to unconditional release.'"
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that a patient committed under these circumstances had a
statutory right to receive adequate therapeutic treatment, and re-
manded the case for a determination of whether the petitioner had
received adequate treatment.'" Judge Bazelon, writing for the majority,
5. The statutory criteria for civil commitment vary among states; commitment
may be solely on the grounds of dangerousness or the need for treatment or both.
F. LINDMAN & D. MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 17 (1961).
6. "Voluntary" admission admittedly is not always truly voluntary since patients
are not free to leave at any time and voluntary admission can lead to civil commit-
ment. Id. at 107. See T. SZAsz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 40 (1963).
7. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d) (1) (Supp. IV 1971).
8. See, e.g., N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 408 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
9. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 1 et seq. (1971), as amended, (Supp.
1971).
10. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3508 (1967); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123A,
6 (1965).
11. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 208 (McKinney 1971).
12. 373 F2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
13. Act of Aug. 9, 1955, ch. 673, § 927(d), 69 Stat. 610 (now D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 24-301(d) (1) (Supp. IV 1971)).
14. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(e) (Supp. IV 1971).
15. On the question of whether petitioner had recovered his sanity, the court held
that on remand the district court could reconsider its finding that petitioner had not
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reached this result by holding that the 1964 Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill Act, 6 which requires that a person hospita'zed because
of mental illness receive psychiatric care and treatment,1" includes
persons involuntarily committed as a result of criminal proceedings.'
Even absent such a statute, however, Judge Bazelon said that forced
confinement in a public mental hospital without treatment might violate
either the due process clause, the equal protection clause or the eighth
amendment to the Constitution. 9
In the six years since the Rouse opinion was written, only one
court has held that confinement for mental illness unaccompanied by
treatment to ameliorate the condition constitutes a denial of due
process.2" Several other courts have suggested that confinement under
these circumstances may constitute cruel and unusual punishment.2'
The cases discussing a constitutional right to treatment have relied on
dicta in cases which upheld both the commitment statutes and the partic-
ular detentions in question.' This analytical weakness does not, how-
recovered his mental health. The court of appeals suggested that the district court
judge may have relied on the nature of the offense with which the petitioner had
originally been charged - carrying a dangerous weapon - and not on the patient's
dangerous propensities arising out of an abnormal mental condition. 373 F.2d at 459.
See also Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
16. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-562 (1967).
17. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-562 (1967), provides: "A person hospitalized in a public
hospital for a mental illness shall, during his hospitalization, be entitled to medical and
psychiatric care and treatment." 373 F.2d at 454.
18. This interpretation of the statute has been criticized in 80 HARV. L. REv. 898,
899 (1967).
19. 373 F.2d at 453. The Rouse court declared that: "[i]ndefinite confinement
without treatment of one who has been found not criminally responsible may be so
inhumane as to be 'cruel and unusual punishment.'" Id.
20. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). Subsequent cases
have suggested that inadequate treatment may violate the due process clause. E.g.,
Nason v. Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 474, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968).
21. The few cases that have contended that the eighth amendment may prohibit
confinement without adequate treatment do so on the theory that merely to confine
such an individual is to punish for the status of being afflicted with a mental disorder.
See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ; Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506
(4th Cir. 1964). Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) ; Easter v. District
of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
22. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (citing dictum in
Rouse v. Cameron as holding); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(relying on dictum in Sas v. Maryland) ; Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir.
1964) (which relied on dictum in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309
U.S. 270 (1940)). The type of casual analysis demonstrated by this interdependent
chain of dicta is exemplified by the Comment, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the
Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967), which stated: "In Sas, the Fourth
Circuit suggested that Maryland's defective delinquent law discriminated against
mentally disturbed defendants . . . ." Id. at 104. On the contrary, the court held
that the statute did not discriminate against that class of individuals. The concern
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ever, indicate that in no case will the Constitution require treatment for
an individual committed to a mental institution. Proper determination
of the constitutional status of the right depends upon the purpose and
length of the confinement and on the amenability of the patient to
treatment.
Commitment that serves as a substitute for imprisonment on
conviction of a crime becomes constitutionally suspect when it exceeds
the length of the prison sentence that could have been imposed. If
the commitment is merely conceived as confinement for the protection
of society from one who could commit such crimes, it is possible that
the right to treatment would not exist. However, it would appear to be
a denial of equal protection to confine for differing periods of time
legally sane criminals incapable of controlling their " 'propensity toward
criminal activity,' "2 legally insane criminals and criminals on whom
no psychiatrist has passed judgment.24 If the commitment is designed
to correct the mental or personality deformities that produce the
criminal act, it would be a denial of due process to withhold the very
treatment that provided the impetus for the confinement.
Commitment that is grounded on the well-being of the patient and
that is to continue until the patient recovers becomes imprisonment
for mental illness if no "humane therapeutic treatment" is provided.25
Casting the deprivation of liberty in terms of "civil" confinement
becomes an exercise in semantics ;21 in truth, the "patient" is imprisoned
of the court's dictum was over the application of the statutory scheme. Sas v. Mary-
land, 334 F2d 506, 514, 516 (4th Cir. 1964).
23. Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 516 (4th Cir. 1964).
24. The Supreme Court suggested in a recent case that the equal protection
clause would forbid the application of different procedural rubrics to commitment
under two different Wisconsin statutes: the Mental Health Act, Wis. STAT. ANN.
ch. 51 (1957), and the sex crimes act, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 959.15 (1958), as amended,
ch. 975 (1971). Humphrey v. Cady, 40 U.S.L.W. 4324, 4326 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1972).
See Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942).
25. Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Fahy, J., con-
curring). The case upheld summary commitment under D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (a)
(Supp. VIII 1960), which in effect allowed commitment on the basis of a jury verdict
that a criminal act had been committed and that there was more than a reasonable
doubt that the person charged was sane at the time of the act.
26. C. Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964) (dictum).
[Airguments as to whether the Act is civil or penal in nature are futile exercises
in semantics. An Act which deprives sane men of their liberty by confining them
under severe discipline with or without treatment requires a basic fairness of
procedure and substance - "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" - to com-
port with the guarantees of our National Constitution.
Id. at 516 n.5. The Supreme Court in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court,
309 U.S. 270 (1940), also read a requirement of "basic fairness of procedure and sub-
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for his madness. Such confinement would seem, per se, to constitute
a denial of due process under the standard of Robinson v. CaliforniaY
Illustrative of this point is Wyatt v. Stickney. s In that case, guardians
of patients involuntarily committed to Bryce Hospital in Alabama
sought an Order of Reference to a panel of experts under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for the purpose of obtaining a factual
determination of the adequacy of treatment actually received at that
institution.29 The plaintiffs alleged that the patients were being denied
their constitutional right to treatment because the hospital was severely
understaffed and therapeutic treatment programs were nonexistent. 30
Judge Johnson concluded that the existing treatment programs
were "scientifically and medically inadequate"'" and "failed to conform
to any known minimums established for providing treatment for the
mentally ill."312 Noting that the plaintiffs had been involuntarily com-
mitted for the purpose of treatment and had been committed through
civil proceedings which lacked the constitutional safeguards character-
istic of criminal trials, the court held that the patients had a right
to treatment. In the court's view, the only constitutional justification
for detaining a person in a hospital under those procedures was treat-
ment; to deprive a patient of such treatment "violates the very funda-
mentals of due process." 3 The reasoning of this case would apply
with equal force to the situation of the voluntarily committed patient,
whose confinement is not necessarily purely voluntary and may lack the
fundamental procedural safeguards of due process."
stance" into a Minnesota statute containing provisions analogous to the Defective
Delinquent Act in Maryland.
27. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
28. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). Judge Johnson placed the authority for
his conclusions solely on Rouse v. Cameron. This analysis is criticized in note 22 supra.
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b) allows a district court to refer particular issues to a
court-appointed master for a report on factual issues. Initially, former employees of
Bryce Hospital joined the suit requesting that they be reinstated but subsequently with-
drew their request.
30. Pre-trial brief for Plaintiffs at 7-8, Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781
(M.D. Ala. 1971). Neither the plaintiffs' brief nor their pre-trial brief raised the
issue of inadequate facilities although the opinion in Wyatt seems to conclude that the
facilities at Bryce were inadequate.
31. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 785.
34. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. Procedural safeguards may have to
be elevated to the rigor of a criminal trial for these "patients." An advocate of the
right to treatment cautions that without stringent safeguards mental hospitals in the
United States could be used as similar institutions in the Soviet Union are now being
used, as political prisons. Dershowitz, A Question of Madness by Zhores A. & Ray
A. Medvedev, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1971, § 7 (Book Review), at 4, col. 2.
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B. Standards for Determining Adequacy of Treatment
Rouse v. Cameron set forth vague and perhaps unworkable stand-
ards for determining adequacy of treatment. According to that decision,
the hospital is required "to provide treatment which is adequate in
light of present knowledge.""6 The treatment prescribed for a particular
patient need not be the best possible, and it need not improve the
patient's condition. To satisfy the requirement of adequate treatment,
the hospital must show a "bona fide effort" to cure and improve; it
must show that it has conducted preliminary and periodic examina-
tions of the individual patient's condition and provided a therapeutic
program suited to the patient's particular mental disability." While
the Rouse court acknowledged that psychiatrists, with their highly
divergent schools of thought, may not agree on the standards for ade-
quate treatment, it declared that lack of consensus did not exonerate
a court from its duty to uphold the rights of a committed patient.3 '
A trial court in reaching a decision could consult independent experts
as well as pertinent data indicating minimum standards of treatment
published by several governmental agencies and such private associa-
tions as the American Psychiatric Association."'
When reviewing the hospital's program of treatment - or lack
thereof - for an individual, the court's role is similar to that when
reviewing agency action; it must decide whether the hospital authorities
have made a "permissible and reasonable decision in view of the
relevant information and within a broad range of discretion." 9 As
pointed out in Covington v. Harris,4" the purpose of this limited
standard of judicial review is to insure that the decision-makers have
made a reasonable decision using the proper criteria and taking account
of everything of substantial relevance.4' Under this standard the
hospital administration is acting as an administrative agency exercising
considerable discretion in making its findings of fact. The reviewing
court is essentially restricted to its function in administrative law -
determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence,
35. 373 F.2d at 456.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 457.
38. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES
(1969). Other sources of pertinent data suggested by Rouse include the National
Institute of Mental Health, the National Association of State Mental Health Program
Directors and the Group for Advancement of Psychiatry.
39. Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See Covington v.
Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
40. 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
41. Id. at 621.
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that is, "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion."42
The approach adopted in Rouse has encountered considerable
criticism; many authorities have questioned the judiciary's qualification
for choosing among multifarious therapies, none of which have been
conclusively shown to be effective.4" If a case before the court involves
a choice among numerous psychotherapies, the standards suggested by
Rouse may not provide sufficient guidelines for determining adequacy."
In addition, the reliability of some of the standards recommended by
Rouse has been attacked. For example, one authority has asserted that
the minimum standards established by the American Psychiatric
Association in 1958 "represent a compromise between what was thought
to be adequate and what was thought had some possibility of being
realized."45
One acceptable solution to the problem of the formulation of
standards is the legislative enactment of standards defining the right
to treatment. Pennsylvania is the only state to have ever attempted
enactment of such legislation. The Pennsylvania Right to Treatment
Law of 1968, which was rejected by the legislature in 1968 and again in
1969, would have resulted in the creation of minimal treatment stand-
42. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). For a discussion
of judicial review of questions of fact in administrative law, see L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 595 (1965). Judge Bazelon has suggested a
specific standard of reasonableness that reviewing courts could apply: is the patient
receiving therapy which recognized psychiatric opinion generally regards as falling
within the range of acceptable alternatives. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to
Treatment, 36 U. CHII. L. REV. 742, 745 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bazelon].
43. Comment, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77
YALE L.J. 87, 104-14 (1967) ; 80 HARv. L. REV. 898 (1967). As Judge Burger wrote
in a concurring opinion in Dobson v. Cameron, 383 F2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1967) : "I have
grave doubts that we are qualified to oversee mental hospitals in cases of civil com-
mitment . . . ." Id. at 523.
The American Psychiatric Association has contended that "[the definition of
treatment and the appraisal of its adequacy are matters for medical determination."
American Psychiatric Association, Position Statement on the Question of Adequacy of
Treatment, 123 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1458 (1967).
44. One authority lists thirty-five methods of psychotherapy. Szasz, supra
note 6, at 215.
45. Solomon, The American Psychiatric Association in Relation to American
Psychiatry, 115 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1 (1958). This statement may not be accurate
today as the American Psychiatric Association has established general standards and
has discontinued its previous reliance on staffing ratios. Compare AMERICAN PSYCHI-
ATRIC Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES (1969), with AMERICAN Psy-
CHIATRIC ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR HOSPITALS AND CLINICS (rev. ed. 1958).
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ards establishing minimum numbers of professional and nonprofessional
staff and a legal right to minimum standards of treatment.46
Despite criticism,4 7 the Rouse standard or a variation of it has
been applied in other jurisdictions. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, for example, in Nason v. Bridgewater State Hospital,4
declared that the requirements of adequate treatment were fulfilled
when the hospital delivered and "followed diligently ' 49 the appropriate
therapy "determined by competent doctors in their best judgment
within the limits of permissible medical practice." 50  In Wyatt v.
Stickney, the federal district court employed a standard of treatment
that would afford the individual "a realistic opportunity to be cured
or to improve his or her mental condition."'"
One of the most far reaching aspects of Rouse v. Cameron was
its denial of the defense of inadequate staff and facilities. This defense
was disallowed because the 1964 Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill
Act did not delimit the treatment due each patient according to the
availability of facilities.52 The District of Columbia Circuit decided
this omission was significant since the Draft Act enacted by many
states provides that every patient is entitled to treatment only "to the
extent that facilities, equipment, and personnel are available . .. .""
46. S.B. 1274, Pa. Gen. Assembly, 1968 Sess.; S.B. 158, Pa. Gen. Assembly, 1969
Sess. This bill would have created a Mental Treatment Standards Committee to
formulate the minimum standards and review them periodically plus a Patient Treat-
ment Review Board to hear and investigate petitions filed on behalf of patients who
allege that they are not receiving treatment meeting the minimum standards.
47. In response to these criticisms Judge Bazelon has argued that courts fre-
quently adjudicate controversies in areas in which they have no expertise, supervising
such matters as railroad rates and power plant construction. Bazelon, Implementing
the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 742 (1969).
48. 353 Mass. 474, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968). For a further discussion of Nason see
note 122 infra and accompanying text.
49. 233 N.E.2d at 914.
50. Id.
51. 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971). The Wyatt standard ignores the
patient who refuses treatment or is not amenable to treatment. For a discussion of the
dilemma presented by the mental patient who either refuses treatment or is unamenable
to treatment, see note 82 infra and accompanying text.
52. The provisions of the 1964 Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act are codified
in D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-501 et seq. (1967).
53. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH & OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, PUB.
HEALTH SERV. PUB. No. 51, DRAFT AcT GOVERNING HOSPITALIZATION OF THE
MENTALLY ILL 14-15 (rev. Sept. 1952). See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 66-344 (Supp. 1969) ;
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.840 (1959); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-13 (Supp. 1971); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.27 (Page 1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7703 (1968).
The American Psychiatric Association prefers the Draft Act approach because
"in the perspective of the over-all mental health manpower shortage in our country,
one must settle for something less until personnel shortages can be overcome."
Position Statement, supra note 43, at 1460.
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Rouse implied that the denial of this defense could be justified even
in the absence of such a statute. While recognizing that no public
mental hospital was considered adequately staffed,54 the court declared
that this fact could not be relied upon to delay indefinitely adequate
treatment.5 5  Citing Watson v. City of Memphis, 5  Judge Bazelon
contended that, "[t]he rights here asserted are * * * present rights
* * * and, unless there is an overwhelmingly compelling reason, they
are to be promptly fulfilled.""7
Other courts have similarly disregarded the budgetary limitations
of mental hospitals." In Sas v. Maryland,59 the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held the Maryland Defective Delinquent Act 0
facially constitutional. However, the court declared "deficiencies in
staff, facilities and finances"'" could undermine the constitutional appli-
cation of that act, since release is not predicated on the termination
of the prison sentence, but rather on mental rehabilitation.62 The case
was then remanded for inquiries into possible deficiencies in staff,
facilities and finances. 3 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit concluded, in
Tippett v. Maryland,6 4 that the purposes of the act were being carried
out in a constitutional fashion. This conclusion, which the court indi-
54. 373 F.2d at 458. As authority for this proposition the Rouse court cited the
U.S. SURGEON GENERAL'S AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON PLANNING FOR MENTAL HEALTH
FACILITIES, PLANNING OF FACILITIES FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 38 (1961);
Solomon, The American Psychiatric Association in Relation to American Psychiatry,
115 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1, 7 (1958).
55. 373 F.2d at 458.
56. 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
57. 373 F.2d at 458, quoting Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 533 (1963).
58. See, e.g., Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964).
59. 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964).
60. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B (1971), as amended, (Supp. 1971). The Defective
Delinquent Act provides for the commitment and treatment of "an individual who, by
the demonstration of persistent aggravated anti-social or criminal behavior, evidences
a propensity toward criminal activity, and who is found to have either such intellectual
deficiency or emotional unbalance, or both, as to clearly demonstrate an actual danger
to society . .. ." Id. § 5 (1971). This statute consequently serves to protect society
from dangerous persons and simultaneously substitutes psychiatric treatment for con-
ventional punishment. However, only persons convicted and sentenced for specified
crimes are subject to the Defective Delinquent Act. Id. § 6.
61. Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 516-17 (4th Cir. 1964).
62. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 5 (1971), permits release when the inmate has
been sufficiently cured to make it reasonably safe to release him.
63. The trial court was also instructed to consider whether the statutory definition
of defective delinquent as applied was sufficiently definitive and whether the statutory
procedures as applied afforded due process within the confrontation requirement of the
sixth amendment. 334 F.2d at 509.
64. 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971) (the appeal of the dismissal on remand of
Sas v. Maryland).
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cated was subject to re-evaluation at any time, was based on increased
appropriations for the institution and its low recidivism rate.65
The rule disallowing the defense of lack of staff and facilities is
an essential element of the right to treatment, since a patient's mental
condition may be aggravated if he is confined without treatment in an
ill-equipped, poorly staffed mental hospital. 6  The Second Circuit de-
clared in a recent case: "[T]here is considerable evidence that a
prolonged commitment in an institution providing only custodial con-
finement for the 'mentally sick' and nothing more may itself cause
serious psychological harm or exacerbate any pre-existing condition."67
This rule is significant considering the general inadequacies of public
mental hospitals. A recent study of twenty-nine inmates committed
to a Michigan hospital showed shortages of facilities and staff, neglect
of patients, numerous treatment failures and retention of patients ready
for discharge.6" As reasonably can be anticipated, there is a direct
correlation between low budgetary appropriations, lack of facilities and
staff, and inadequate treatment.69 It has been demonstrated that under-
staffing and lack of physical facilities result in custodial care, which
means that the least-trained hospital employee exercises the greatest
control over a patient's treatment.70
C. Application of Standards
In applying standards, the courts have focused on three factors:
(1 ) the hospital facilities and resources as a whole, including physician-
patient ratios, staff-patient ratios and cost-per-patient statistics;71 (2)
the treatment received by patients in general72 and (3) the type of
treatment received by the individual patient.73
65. Id. at 1158 n.18. But see McCray v. Maryland, Misc. Pet. No. 4363 (Howard
County Cir. Ct. Nov. 11, 1971), wherein the court stated that the Patuxent Institution
where defective delinquents are committed was not offering total rehabilitative treat-
ment. Id. at 41.
66. "The milieu of the hospital, if properly structured, is ... a constructive force
in getting well; if improperly constructed it is a force for remaining sick." Hearings
on a Bill to Protect the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subeomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
12 (1963) (remarks of Dr. D. Cameron, Superintendent, St. Elizabeth's Hosp.).
67. United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071, 1079 (2d Cir. 1969).
68. Lewin, Disposition of the Irresponsible: Protection Following Commitment,
66 MIc. L. REv. 721 (1968).
69. Position Statement, supra note 43, at 1460.
70. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
71. Nason v. Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 474, 233 N.E.2d 908, 911 n.6
(1968).
72. Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397 (1966).
73. Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
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By suggesting that courts determine adequacy of treatment given
plaintiffs in light of data which reflect the minimum objective stand-
ards of treatment as determined by certain agencies, Rouse encouraged
judicial inquiries into the treatment administered to the overall patient
populace at the institution in question. Maryland adopted this approach
in Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels,7 4 in which two inmates
committed to a mental institution under the Maryland Defective De-
linquent Act challenged their confinement as unconstitutional. Although
the major thrust of the suit was the unconstitutionality of the Act, one
petitioner also alleged that Patuxent was not furnishing him adequate
treatment, and as a result he was being denied equal protection of the
laws.75 After examining the physical plant and the treatment furnished
to all inmates of Patuxent, the court concluded that the milieu therapy76
afforded all patients treatment.77 The court held that Daniels had not
been denied equal protection since he "has received or had had available
to him ... all of the treatment techniques available to other inmates at
Patuxent, and also as generally recognized and utilized in the field
of psychiatry . . .,,"
The approach taken in Daniels has been criticized for neglecting
totally the most crucial aspect of the right to treatment - the duty
imposed on the institution to afford each patient appropriate therapy.
By concentrating examination on the operation of the entire hospital,
the court could find compliance with acceptable standards on that level
ignoring the fact that an individual patient may not be receiving
adequate treatment.79
74. 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397 (1966).
75. In this respect, the Daniels court held that the indeterminate confinement,
treatment and rehabilitation provisions of the Defective Delinquent Act are reasonably
calculated to effect the purpose of the Act. 243 Md. at 42-43, 221 A.2d at 412-13.
76. The Daniels court discussed at length the "therapeutic milieu" offered at
Patuxent. 243 Md. at 58-64, 221 A.2d at 421-26. Milieu treatment or therapy refers
to the organization of the hospital ward so that all its parts are designed to have a
particular impact on the patient. See Position Statement, supra note 43, at 1460;
Goocher, The Milieu Therapy Approach on a Maximum Security Ward: Develop-
ment, Results, and Implications, PSYCHIATRIC STUDIES & PROJECTS, Oct., 1964, at 2.
77. The court in its findings of fact, nevertheless, did note "lapses in the treatment
program and the efficient operation of the Institution" but did not conclude that these
lapses were sufficiently flagrant to have a bearing on the constitutional questions. 243
Md. at 65, 221 A2d at 426.
78. 243 Md. at 50, 221 A.2d at 417. This approach which focuses on the treatment
given the patient populace in general was initially suggested in Sas v. Maryland, 334
F.2d 506, 517 (4th Cir. 1964).
79. See Address by David L. Bazelon, Chief Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 20th Mental Hospital Institute, Oct. 3,
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Of course, when the treatment received by all the patients com-
mitted to the hospital is at issue, the Daniels approach is appropriate.
In Wyatt v. Stickney,8 ° a class action initiated on behalf of all patients
confined in Alabama's Bryce Hospital, the district court rightfully
made an extensive inquiry into the staffing of the hospital, the function
of the hospital regarding the mental condition of patients committed
and the hospital budget.8'
The internal logic supporting the right to treatment breaks down
when applied to the untreatable patient or the patient who refuses
treatment. In both instances the patient cannot receive treatment
calculated to improve his mental condition, turning his confinement
into mere detention. The Rouse standard requiring a "bona fide effort"
to cure is irrelevant to the problem patient who is found unamenable
to treatment; indeed, Rouse v. Cameron deliberately chose to ignore
this dilemma.82 According to the Rouse rationale a hospital must
continue its efforts to cure and improve the patient, a course of action
that could lead to an indeterminate confinement.8" Likewise, the Rouse
standard cannot be applied to a patient who refuses treatment, unless
such refusal is viewed as an affirmative defense to the obligation placed
upon the defendant institution.' These considerations raise the ques-
tion of whether the right to treatment imposes a corresponding duty
to accept treatment. Such a contention runs the risk of constituting
1968. See generally Halpern, A Practicing Lawyer Views the Right to Treatment,
57 GEo. L.J. 107, 116 (1969).
Judge Sobeloff, in his concurring opinion in Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d
1153, 1159 (4th Cir. 1971), urged Maryland courts to look not only to the general
treatment program but also to the treatment the individual is receiving.
80. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
81. Id. The Wyatt court suggested that the commitment of non-psychiatric geri-
atric patients was not proper since they were not mentally ill and therefore could not
benefit from psychiatric treatment.
82. Rouse v. Cameron relegated discussion of the untreatable patient to a footnote
in which the court declared: "We need not now resolve the implications of 'the right
to treatment' for a patient who is demonstrated by the hospital to be 'untreatable' in
the present state of psychiatric knowledge, if such a patient exists." 373 F.2d at 457 n.28.
83. This standard was applied in Eidinoff v. Connolly, 281 F. Supp. 191 (N.D.
Tex. 1968), in which expert testimony indicated that the patient, a true paranoid,
was not amenable to treatment.
84. One practical basis for such a defense may lie in the fact that the success of
many treatment plans, particularly group therapy and psychotherapy, depend on the
patient's cooperation. Szasz, supra note 6, at 314. The argument has also been
advanced that untreatable patients receive adequate treatment even though they are
receiving purely custodial care since nothing more can be provided for them. 80 HARv.
L. REv. 898, 900 (1967).
For an excellent critique of the legal problem raised by the patient who
refuses to accept treatment, see Katz, The Right to Treatment - An Enchanting
Legal Fiction?, 36 U. CI. L. Rxv. 755 (1969).
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an invalid infringement on an area of personal privacy similar to
freedom from forced medical treatment for a non-contagious disease. 5
The recent case of McCray v. Maryland"8 represents one of the
rare attempts by a court to deal with the problems surrounding the
refusal of treatment. There, several patients confined to Patuxent
Institution as defective delinquents87 filed habeas corpus petitions alleg-
ing that the institution's disciplinary procedures violated their constitu-
tional rights. Responding to the practice of deliberately withholding
rehabilitative efforts to "recalcitrant prisoners," the court declared
that patients could not be confined indefinitely for purposes of treatment
and then be deprived of all therapy unless the authorities first endeav-
ored to discover the basis for refusal."' Implicit in the obligation placed
on the administrators to provide treatment was the necessity of dis-
tinguishing between the patient who is "so emotionally unstable that
he refuses help" and the patient who is consciously hostile to treatment
attempts.89 The court did not, however, indicate what the administrator
was to do once he had decided in which category a patient belonged.
II. REMEDIES FOR THE INDIVIDUAL PATIENT
Judicial determination that a right to treatment does exist and
has been denied to a particular individual is academic absent enforce-
ment mechanisms capable of ensuring a patient the treatment due him.
Obviously, the responsibility for understaffed and poorly equipped
hospitals must rest with state legislatures and with a society which
has not yet deemed treatment of the mentally ill a goal worthy of
85. Cf. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92
(1914) (removal of tumor by surgeon without patient's consent held an assault).
Accord, Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905). For a discussion of
this problem see Katz, The Right to Treatment - An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36
U. CHm. L. REv. 755, 756 (1969).
86. Misc. Pet. No. 4363 (Howard County Cir. Ct. Nov. 11, 1971). Patients con-
fined in isolation cells at Patuxent brought this class action on behalf of all those
similarly confined in segregation sections of that institution.
87. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
88. Misc. Pet. No. 4363, at 42 (Howard County Cir. Ct. Nov. 11, 1971).
89. Id.
The McCray court ordered that the administrators of Patuxent revise the
rules and regulations to comply with the dictates of procedural due process and
eliminate vestiges of cruel and unusual punishment as well as mail censorship.
The State of Maryland has accepted the McCray order with the exception of
five rules, including that which requires intensified treatment for those patients
in segregated tiers. The Attorney General, accordingly, requested a stay pending
an appeal of the order as it relates to the five disputed areas. The stay was
denied and the order modified in June. See The Sun (Baltimore), June 3, 1972,
§ B, at 11, cols. 1-3, and June 6, 1972, § A, at 1, col. 7. One week later, the
Maryland Court of Appeals overruled the Circuit Court and granted the stay.
The Sun (Baltimore), June 10, 1972, § A, at 12, col. 1.
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substantial tax revenues. Four remedies - release of a patient denied
adequate treatment, confinement in a manner less restrictive than
total deprivation of liberty, award of damages to a patient deprived
of treatment and a court order compelling the initiation of therapeutic
programs - should be analyzed both in the context of their effectiveness
in assuring treatment to those committed to public mental hospitals
and in terms of the factual circumstances in which each remedy
is appropriate.
A. Release
Rouse v. Cameron suggested that release would be a sufficient
remedy if "the opportunity for treatment has been exhausted or treat-
ment is otherwise inappropriate."9 If the reason for confinement is
treatment, then the internal logic of the syllogism requires that a
patient be released if treatment is denied. Similarly, if a hospital
denies adequate treatment on a mass basis, the same internal logic
might require all the patients to be transferred to another facility
capable of providing therapy. Simple logic, however, is not necessarily
efficacious. Release of a patient dangerous to himself or society is an
extreme action. Never has a court ordered the release of a patient
denied treatment, or ordered the closing of a public mental hospital.
Even were such a remedy contemplated, hospital administrators would
surely be granted a period of grace to develop a treatment program.91
Moreover, release of one patient does not insure that the hospital will
institute adequate treatment programs for the remaining patients who
are being denied treatment.
92
Release might be inappropriate for the untreatable patient,9 3 but
the courts that have had to deal with that issue have chosen to sidestep
it. For example, in People ex rel. Blunt v. Narcotics Addiction Control
90. 373 F.2d at 459.
91. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ; Nason v.
Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 474, 233 N.E.2d 908, 914 (1968).
92. Judge Bazelon believes that "the fact that courts will release committed
patients unless treatment can be provided seems a compelling argument for a larger
appropriation from the legislature." Address by David L. Bazelon, supra note 79.
However, as Judge Bazelon points out, the legislature might "retaliate" by committing
persons solely on the basis of dangerousness. Id.
93. Barnes v. Director of Patuxent Institution, 240 Md. 32, 212 A.2d 465 (1965)
(held constitutional to confine an individual considered untreatable due to his dan-
gerous characteristics) ; People v. Rancier, 240 Cal. App. 2d 579, 49 Cal. Rptr. 876
(1966) (held not cruel and unusual punishment to confine indefinitely a sexual
psychopath unamenable to treatment on ground that court could not conclude that he
"has been or in the future will be denied treatment." 49 Cal. Rptr. at 879).
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Board,94 a narcotics addict whose sentence to a New York prison was
predicated on his receiving treatment for addiction sought release on the
ground that he was receiving no treatment. 5 The court found that the
only therapy offered was a group therapy session conducted two or three
times a week which Blunt refused to attend. Although the court
strongly suggested that the drug addiction program was inadequate
and lacked competent professional personnel, it dismissed the habeas
corpus petition on the theory that the court could not interfere with
"[t]he experimental nature of the program."9 6 In light of the un-
disputed evidence that Blunt in fact received treatment no different
from non-addict prisoners, the New York court's decision seems
unduly restrained.9 7 The right to treatment theory could be seen to
dictate that persons committed under statutes similar to the New York
Drug Addiction Law or the Maryland Defective Delinquent Act, who
refuse treatment or demonstrate themselves to be untreatable, should
be returned to the custody of prison officials in order to serve the
remainder of the statutory sentence of the crimes for which they had
previously been convicted. Such statutes substitute treatment for
conventional punishment of those persons convicted and sentenced for
94. 58 Misc. 2d 57, 295 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mern., 31 App. Div. 2d 718,
296 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1968).
95. Blunt was given a maximum sentence of thirty-six months under a New York
drug addiction statute. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 208 (McKinney 1971). This
statute certifies any misdemeanant or person convicted of prostitution who is found
to be a narcotics addict to the custody of the Narcotic Addiction Control Commission.
Such persons remain in the Commission's custody until rehabilitation or until the
expiration of thirty-six months.
No provision of the New York drug addiction law guarantees a right to
treatment although the provisions implicitly seem to envision treatment of addicts.
96. 295 N.Y.S.2d at 282. For another example of failure to deal with a patient's
refusal to accept treatment, see In re Newton, 353 Mass. 474, 259 N.E.2d 190 (1970),
in which the court held that petitioner sentenced to Bridgewater Treatment Center
for an indefinite period as a sexually dangerous person could not complain of inadequate
treatment if he refused treatment.
97. Other courts have likewise exhibited reluctance to interfere with the opera-
tion of experimental programs. See Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1157 (4th
Cir. 1971) ; Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 42, 221 A.2d 397,
411 (1966).
A New York court recently in People ex rel. Stutz v. Conboy, 59 Misc.
2d 791, 300 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1969), upheld confinement in state prisons
of persons committed pursuant to the provisions of the drug addiction law. The court
justified the confinement of these misdemeanants (who would have spent no more
than one year in prison) for a three-year program of treatment even though the
program itself was conducted in a prison rather than a hospital. Noting that the
prisoners could have been released in less than three years if "properly motivated"
the court rationalized that "[u]nder the circumstances, they [had to] take the bad with
the good." 300 N.Y.S.2d at 458.
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specified crimes whose mental condition is deemed to necessitate treat-
ment. Though convicted initially by criminal standards these persons
are committed under civil procedures to confinement longer than that of
the original statutory sentence.98 The release compelled by the logic
of the Rouse test discussed earlier could at least be accommodated by
"releasing" the dangerous patient unamenable to treatment to his former
prison sentence.
In contrast to dangerous criminals, many mental patients pose
no threat to society.09 Consequently, when these patients receive only
custodial care and are denied the therapy which forms the basis for
their continued confinement, release might be proper.' Judge Skelly
Wright, in his concurring opinion in Lake v. Cameron,'° contended
that the mere fact that an individual's mental condition demands cus-
todial care does not also entitle the government to compel acceptance
of care at the price of freedom.'0 2 In that case, a harmless but senile
sixty-year-old woman who frequently could not care for herself sought
unconditional release. During her four-year confinement at Saint
Elizabeth's she had received only custodial care. The majority of the
District of Columbia Circuit, however, was not as inclined toward
release as was Judge Skelly Wright and sought instead a less restrictive
alternative to her confinement.1 3
Unconditional release is a remedy of last resort; should circum-
stances occasion its use, the dangerousness of the patient must be taken
into account. The harmless patient may in some cases appropriately
be released, or in others at least provided a less restrictive incarceration.
Release of the dangerous patient is not practicable; even so, several
authorities rightly assert that the procedures for committing this type
98. In contrast to the New York law under which the maximum period of in-
carceration is thirty-six months, the Defective Delinquent Act allows for indefinite
confinement.
99. A recent unpublished survey taken at Saint Elizabeth's Hospital in Wash-
ington, D.C., showed that a substantial majority of patients were not dangerous. The
Evening Star (Washington), Aug. 9, 1971, § A, at 1, col. 1. The newspaper article
indicated that the statistics were recorded in a confidential preliminary report of patient
inventory prepared by the hospital staff in 1970.
For an excellent discussion of the difficulties inherent in determining whether
a patient will be harmful to himself or others upon release, see Goldstein & Katz,
Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some Observations on the Decision to Release
Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225 (1960).
100. Comment, Compulsory Commitment: The Rights of the Incarcerated Mentally
Ill, DUKE L.J. 677, 725 (1969).
101. 364 F.2d 657, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1966). For a further discussion of Lake v.
Cameron, see note 111 infra and accompanying text.
102. 364 F.2d at 663.
103. For some of the alternatives suggested by the Lake court, see note 113 infra.
1972)
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
of patient should include the constitutional safeguards characteristic
of a criminal trial.
10 4
B. The "Less Restrictive Alternative"
The American Psychiatric Association estimates that in 1967,
ninety percent of all patients in mental hospitals, both public and
private, were harmless.' At Washington, D.C.'s Saint Elizabeth's
Hospital sixty-eight percent of the patients "had 'no behavior prob-
lem' " and "could [not] be considered dangerous to themselves or
others by any definition of the term."'0 6 Physicians at Saint Elizabeth's
concluded that only thirty-two percent of the patients required in-
patient care, recommending that thirty-five percent be provided with
foster care, twenty-one percent be placed in nursing homes, and twelve
percent be cared for in other places, such as their own homes. 7 The
thrust of these and other reports is that a number of patients presently
confined could be cared for on an outpatient basis.' Instead, more
than half the patients at Saint Elizabeth's were confined in wards with
no building, ground or city privileges.'0 9
One solution to the problem of undue long-term hospitalization,
of course, lies in legislation. The California legislature recently enacted
a statute designed to eliminate "inappropriate, indefinite, and involun-
tary commitment of mentally disordered persons.""' The District of
Columbia Circuit in Lake v. Cameron"' presented another solution
when it recognized that the 1964 Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill
Act allows a court to order " 'any other alternative course of treatment
which the court believes will be in the best interests of the person or
of the public.' 112 Although the evidence showed that Mrs. Lake,
104. See Bazelon, supra note 47, at 749; Comment, Due Process for All - Con-
stitutional Standards for Involuntary Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U. CmI. L.
REv. 633, 649 (1967).
Traditionally, the courts have upheld civil commitment procedures that gave
no notice or hearing until the patient was hospitalized. E.g., Sporza v. German Sav.
Bank, 192 N.Y. 8, 84 N.E. 406 (1908). Recently, several courts have suggested that
committing procedures should be the same for civil and criminal commitment; patients
should have the right to notice, a hearing, counsel, an independent psychiatric examina-
tion and cross-examination. See Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D.
Pa. 1971) ; Anderson v. Solomon, 315 F. Supp. 1192 (D. Md. 1970).
105. Position Statement, supra note 43, at 1459.
106. The Evening Star (Washington), Aug. 9, 1971, § A, at 1, col. 1.
107. Id. at 6, col. 8.
108. 1963 Hearings, supra note 66, at 25 (remarks of Dr. W. Overholser, Super-
intendent, St. Elizabeth's Hosp.).
109. The Evening Star (Washington), Aug. 9, 1971, § A, at 6, col. 7.
110. CAL. WEa.F. & INST'NS CODE § 5001(a) (West Supp. 1971).
111. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
112. Id. at 659, quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-545(b) (Supp. V 1966).
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who could not care for herself, needed care, the majority declared that
deprivation of liberty solely based on danger to the patient herself
should not exceed what is necessary to protect the patient. Thus, the
Lake court mandated the hospital and the trial judge to explore
alternatives that would allow Mrs. Lake a degree of liberty consonant
with the degree of care required."" The principle of the "least re-
strictive alternative" was extended to alternate dispositions within the
hospital in Covington v. Harris,"' primarily on the basis of the 1964
Act and, secondarily, on the rationale underlying the right to treatment.
In that case, petitioner, who had been civilly committed to Saint
Elizabeth's ten years earlier, after the dismissal of a murder charge,
sought transfer to a less restrictive ward."' Confinement in a maximum
security ward was reasonable, the majority ruled, only when the
hospital had found inadequate all alternative dispositions. The opinion
noted in this connection that confinement in a maximum security
ward may not be "beneficial 'environmental therapy'" for all and,
therefore, the hospital must substantiate the considerations behind
such confinement"16
From these decisions it can be shown that if a patient demon-
strates that he is not dangerous and that his mental condition does not
require full-time hospitalization, conditional release with out-patient
treatment, or placement in a halfway house or foster or rest home
might be the most appropriate remedy. Similarly, if confinement within
the institution is mandatory the patient should be confined in the
least restrictive atmosphere, keeping the confinement consonant with
its legal justification.
C. Damages
Sometimes institutional neglect reaches tortious proportions. In
1947, a middle-aged man was committed to New York's notorious
Matteawan State Hospital upon a finding that he was incompetent to
113. The Lake court suggested that on remand the lower court consider public
health nursing care, community health and day care services, foster care, home health
aide services and private care. 364 F.2d at 661. The court also held that plaintiff did
not bear the burden of showing the availability of alternatives since proceedings in-
volving care and treatment are not adversary.
114. 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
115. Covington was confined in the maximum security ward, the John Howard
Pavilion, which has the characteristics of a prison. See An Hoc COMMITTEE FOR THE
EVALUATION OF SECURITY PROGRAMS AND FACILITIES AT SAINT ELIZABETH'S HOSPITAL,
THE EVALUATION OF SECURITY PROGRAMS AND FACILITIES AT SAINT ELIZABETH'S
HOSPITAL (Nov. 1, 1968) (excerpts reprinted in 419 F.2d 617, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
116. 419 F.2d at 625, quoting Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 456 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
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stand trial for a violation of probation. 1 7 In the fourteen and one-half
year nightmare that followed, this patient received only three in depth
psychiatric examinations, all of which were in the first four months
of his confinement.'" Following his release, the now aging victim
of delinquent inactivity brought suit against New York seeking money
damages for false imprisonment, negligent psychiatric treatment and
assault on his person. The court in Whitree v. State found that had
he received proper care, plaintiff would have been released some twelve
years earlier than he was."' Applying common law principles the
court held that he had not received psychiatric and medical treatment
conforming to the standards of the community. Negligence was deter-
mined to be the causative factor of the inordinate length of a confinement
constituting false imprisonment. The award to Whitree totaled
$300,000, a sum compensating him for the decade of negligent treatment
and for the severe physical injuries inflicted on him by the hospital
staff and his fellow patients.
Since few causes of action for damages have been brought, only
speculative evaluations of their effectiveness in implementing the right
to treatment can be made. Certainly, only a few awards of the pro-
portions of Whitree need be affirmed in a state before the legislature
will appropriate funds to improve public mental hospitals. On the
other hand, an award of damages affects only one individual directly
and then only after he has suffered great abuse. Other patients are
affected only in an indirect fashion; an award of damages only assists
them if the legislature increases appropriations.
III. CURING AN ENTIRE HOSPITAL: THE REMEDY OF
Wyatt v. Stickney
A. The Order to the Hospital
A court order compelling a hospital to institute adequate treatment
may be the most viable method of enforcing the right to treatment.
117. Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968). Whitree
had been placed on probation a year earlier after a conviction for assault in the third
degree. For an analysis of the application of a common law tort standard to a public
mental hospital and a complete discussion of the case itself, see 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1771 (1969).
118. The abusive treatment of Whitree was blatant. The court found that the
petitioner not only received improper psychiatric care but inadequate medical care
as well. Whitree was placed in maximum security for over four years; the psychiatric
notes taken during this period were all closely related in time to applications for writs
of habeas corpus. In addition, Whitree was never exposed to psychotherapy or
psychological testing. He was beaten by patients as well as by attendants. The court
also found that had Whitree been given proper psychiatric care he would have been
discharged no later than May 19, 1949. 290 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
119. Id.
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Characteristically, Rouse v. Cameron first recommended that the hos-
pital be granted "a reasonable opportunity to initiate treatment 1 20 as
an alternative to release should a court find a mandatorily committed
patient was being denied adequate treatment. The opinion also
suggested criteria for determining the latitude that might be given to
a hospital in developing a program: the length of time the patient has
been denied adequate treatment, the length of his total confinement, the
mental condition that led to confinement and any dangerous tendencies
of the patient that would be manifested if he were released could be
considered. 2'
Nason v. Bridgewater State Hospital122 also considered applying
the remedy of compelled treatment to a single petitioner seeking a writ
of habeas corpus. The Nason court found that the standards of
treatment provided at Bridgewater were inconsistent with good practice
and failed to conform to the accreditation requirements of the American
Psychiatric Hospital Association or the licensing requirements of
Massachusetts. 12 ' However, Bridgewater was permitted a reasonable
opportunity to institute adequate therapeutic programs for Nason and
the patient population in general before the court would contemplate
other remedies.
The pragmatic approach of the district court in shaping the remedy
in Wyatt v. Stickney124 contrasts with the uncertain enforcement of
the right to treatment in Rouse and Nason'2 5 The generally deplorable
conditions prevalent at Bryce Hospital in Alabama may well have caused
the court to abandon the earlier period of adjustment. Evidence intro-
duced at trial, for example, indicated that a patient population of 5,200
was being "cared for" by only three medical doctors with psychiatric
training, none of whom had been certified by the Medical Board of
Examiners. In addition, recent staff dismissals precipitated by a
budgetary crisis affecting Alabama's mental health program left Bryce
with but two clinical psychologists, 2 " ten to twelve patient activity
workers and ten social workers, two of whom had master's degrees.' 2 7
The Bryce staff seems to have been so minimal that patients did not
receive adequate custodial care, not to mention therapeutic treatment.
120. 373 F.2d 451, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
121. Id.
122. 353 Mass. 474, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968).
123. 233 N.E.2d at 912 n.7.
124. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
125. See text accompanying notes 36-42, 122-23 supra.
126. One clinical psychologist had a Ph.D while the other had a master's degree.
Pre-trial brief for Plaintiff at 4, Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
127. Id.
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When representatives of the United States Department of Justice
visited Bryce subsequent to the decision in Wyatt v. Stickney, they
i:eportedly found "human feces caked on toilets, patients who had not
been bathed in days, urine on the floor, stopped up plumbing, [and]
beds without linen."'
1 28
Judge Johnson held that inadequate treatment at Bryce was di-
rectly attributable to lack of operating funds. There was undisputed
evidence that Alabama in 1970 ranked last among the states in per-
patient expenditures and that the treatment standards at Bryce were
so deficient that the hospital was not eligible for Medicare and Medicaid
programs. 12  Judge Johnson also found that the hospital population
improperly included 1,500 to 1,600 geriatric patients as well as 1,000
mental retardates who could not benefit from psychiatric treatment.
The Wyatt court held that "lack of operating funds" could not justify
a denial of treatment.30  Quoting Rouse v. Cameron'1' which quoted
Watson v. City of Memphis,13 Judge Johnson reasoned that insufficient
finances was not an" 'overwhelmingly compelling reason' " for denying
"'present rights.' "133
Acknowledging that Bryce's transition to the unit-team system 34
was incomplete, Judge Johnson denied the motion for an Order of
Reference in order to give the Mental Health Board the opportunity
to initiate and implement standards that would provide adequate care
and treatment for the patients at Bryce. In contrast with previous
orders of this nature, the Wyatt decree was comprehensive; it ordered
the plaintiffs to submit within ninety days a specific plan for providing
adequate treatment, a definition describing Bryce's function and mission,
and a report indicating the progress of implementation of the unit-
team system." The order required the defendants to institute within
128. The Tuscaloosa (Ala.) News, Aug. 1, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
129. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). See JOINT INFORMATION SERVICE,
REVISIoN FOR FIFTEEN INDICES (1971).
130. 325 F. Supp. at 784.
131. 373 F.2d 451, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
132. 373 U.S. 526, 533 (1963).
133. 325 F. Supp. at 784.
134. Typically, the unit-team system divides a state into geographical county units
with all patients from a particular geographic area assigned to the same unit in a
hospital. A team consisting of professionals, physicians, psychologists, social workers,
aides and nurses, coordinates the treatment program of each unit. See Zubowicz, The
Change to a Unit System, PSYCHIATRIC STUDIES & PROJECTS, Aug., 1969, at 1.
135. The order also directed that a progress report list the names of patients
entitled to receive psychiatric care and the treatment administered. This list was to
be made available to the plaintiffs and all parties entering the case as amici curiae
325 F. Supp. at 784.
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six months a treatment program that would give every treatable patient
"a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental
condition."'" 6 Failure to comply with the decree would result in the
appointment of a panel of experts to effectuate the order. Finally, the
court invited the United States Departments of Justice and Health,
Education and Welfare and the Public Health Service to appear as
amici curiae to assist the court in its subsequent evaluation of Bryce
Hospital and the defendants in complying with the Departments'
standards.
Following that evaluation, Judge Johnson held the treatment
program proposed by the Mental Health Board deficient in three funda-
mental areas because it failed to establish "(1) a humane psychological
and physical environment, (2) qualified staff in numbers sufficient
to administer adequate treatment, and (3) individualized treatment
plans." '' l Formal hearings were consequently ordered to formulate
minimum medical and constitutional standards for the operation of
Bryce and two other institutions, Searcy Hospital, a mental institution,
and Partlow State School and Hospital, an institution for the mentally
retarded. 3 ' In the third Wyatt decision, the court made its order
applicable to involuntarily confined mental retardates because they also
"have a constitutional right to receive such individual habilitation as
will give each of them a realistic opportunity to lead a more useful
and meaningful life and to return to society."' 9 Judge Johnson
reasoned that this conclusion was necessary if society is to justify civil
commitment of mentally retarded persons.
As a result of these hearings the court formulated minimum
medical and constitutional standards for the two mental hospitals and
the institution for the retarded. 4  The minimum standards for Bryce
and Searcy Hospitals stipulate inter alia that "[p] atients have a right
to the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the purposes
of commitment ;' '141 "to send sealed mail ;' 142 "to be free from un-
necessary or excessive medication ;,,14' and not to be subjected to shock
136. Id. at 785.
137. Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
138. Searcy and Bryce were included when the class of plaintiffs was enlarged to
encompassed the patients confined at those two institutions.
139. Wyatt v. Stickney, Civil No. 3195-N, at 3 (Partlow State School and
Hospital) (MD. Ala. Apr. 13, 1972).
140. Wyatt v. Stickney, Civil No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala. Apr. 13, 1972).
141. Wyatt v. Stickney, Civil No. 3195-N, at 9 (Bryce Hospital and Searcy
Hospital) (M.D. Ala. Apr. 13, 1972).
142. Id. at 10.
143. Id.
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therapy without "their express and informed consent after consultation
with counsel or [an] interested party of the patient's choice."' 44 In
addition, the court ordered the Mental Health Board to implement
specific staff-patient ratios and to devise individual treatment plans.
A human rights committee was also judicially created to review all
research proposals and rehabilitative programs and to advise and assist
patients alleging infringement of their legal rights. 4 5 Finally, defendants
were ordered to report to the court within six months on the progress
of implementation including justifications for incomplete performance.
Judge Johnson reserved the right to appoint a master and a professional
advisory committee in the event that the State did not satisfactorily
comply with the order.
The Wyatt remedy, if followed in subsequent decisions, may
provide a viable, effective alternative to release of treatable patients
who have been denied treatment. This decision indicates that the
judiciary has a flexible tool for rectifying those conditions that deprive
patients of treatment. In addition, the decision may induce other
courts to compel the furnishing of the outpatient services discussed
earlier for those patients whose mental condition does not require full-
time hospitalization. Indeed, the minimum standards established for
Bryce and Searcy hospitals provide that the Mental Health Board is
obligated to offer outpatient services to patients upon their release from
involuntary confinement.' 46 Until now, outpatient treatment has been
denied many of these patients on the ground that appropriate facilities
did not exist. The reasoning of Wyatt v. Stickney and Rouse v.
Cameron would disallow this defense.' 4 1 Consequently, a court could
fashion a decree similar to the one in Wyatt, ordering the state to
provide effective alternatives within a specific period of time on threat
of direct judicial intervention.
144. Id. at 11.
145. A human rights committee with similar functions was also established at
Partlow.
146. The Wyatt court declared that such services should include "psychiatric day
care, treatment in the home by a visiting therapist, nursing home or extended care,
outpatient treatment, and treatment in the psychiatric ward of a general hospital."
Wyatt v. Stickney, Civil No. 3195-N, at 21 (Bryce Hospital and Searcy Hospital)
(M.D. Ala. Apr. 13, 1972).
147. Cf. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 537 (1963), in which Justice
Goldberg declared: "it is obvious that vindication of conceded constitutional rights
cannot be made dependent upon any theory that it is less expensive to deny than to
afford them"; Long v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 22 (D. Md. 1970), and Holt v. Sarver,
309 F. Supp. 362 (D. Ark. 1970), in which the need to conserve state finances was
held an insufficient justification for continuation of unconstitutional practices.
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Fearing such intervention, several states have enacted statutes
providing that a patient is entitled to treatment "to the extent that
facilities, equipment, and personnel are available.' 14  Applying the
holding in the first Wyatt decision would necessarily render such
statutory provisions unconstitutional if the right to treatment is a
constitutional right, since according to that decision lack of facilities
is not a compelling justification for denying a constitutional right.
A recently decided case may be instructive by way of analogy. In
North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 41 the Supreme
Court invalidated a North Carolina statute prohibiting busing and
the assignment of students to schools on the basis of race to attain
racial balance. Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court,
asserted that "state policy must give way when it operates to hinder
vindication of federal constitutional guarantees."' Similarly, the Draft
Act statutes, by permitting public mental health authorities to delimit
the delivery of treatment on the basis of the availability of facilities,
would prevent the realization of the constitutional right to treatment.
B. The Order to the Legislature
The remedy mandated by Wyatt v. Stickney raises questions
concerning the authority of the judiciary to compel the legislature,
however indirectly, to appropriate additional funds for public mental
hospitals. The propriety of judicial intervention in matters falling
within the jurisdiction of the legislative or executive branch when
those branches act in derogation of constitutional rights is generally
accepted.'' For example, the Supreme Court in Watson v. City of
Memphis, 52 ordered immediate desegregation of public parks main-
tained by the city on the theory that when constitutional rights are
being violated, prompt rectification of the situation is necessary. The
judiciary has, however, been hesitant in the past to interfere when
dealing with the constitutionality of prison systems and public mental
148. These statutes are based on the DRAFT ACT, supra note 53, § 19. The Act has
been adopted in IDAHO CODE § 66-344 (Supp. 1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.840
(1959); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-13 (Supp. 1971); Oitio REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.27
(Page 1970) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7703 (1968).
149. 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
150. Id. at 45.
151. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and cases imple-
menting it: e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) ; Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) ; United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ.,
395 U.S. 225 (1969) ; Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
152. 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
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hospital administrations, deferring their judgment to "administrative
expertise. 1 -
53
The recent Eighth Circuit case of Holt v. Sarver,'" typifies the
movement now underway to reject the "hands-off" approach. In Holt,
prisoners in Arkansas state prisons sought a declaratory judgment
that the state's practices, acts and policies in the prison system violated
their constitutional rights. The court denied without discussion the
state's motion to dismiss on the ground that the suit was nothing
more than an attempt to compel the legislature to appropriate more
funds for the operation of the prison system. The district court then
held that the conditions in the prison system amounted to cruel and
unusual punishment and ordered their elimination as soon as possible.
To destroy the remnants of this unconstitutional system, the district
court declared that if Arkansas intended to maintain a prison system,
it had to be operated within the framework of the Constitution.
15
Hence, the obligation placed on the State Board of Corrections to
extinguish the unconstitutional aspects of the system exceeded "what
the Legislature may do, or . . . what the Governor may do, or, indeed
. . . what Respondents may actually be able to accomplish."' 56 The
third Wyatt decision likewise recognized that implementation of the
order required the state legislature to appropriate the necessary funds.
Here, however, the legislature was put on notice that the court would
utilize other methods to raise the requisite funds if the legislature
failed to finance the required improvements. The opinion does not
explicitly state what methods might be pursued other than the appoint-
ment of a master and an advisory panel. 5 '
153. Typical of the traditional "hands-off" approach concerning the administra-
tion of prisons is McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964). See generally
Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. Rtv. 795
(1969).
154. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1969), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
155. Id. at 368. The constitutional underpinnings of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956), seem to support this conclusion. There the Supreme Court held that if
Illinois recognized the right to appellate review, the due process and equal protection
clauses would require that stenographic transcripts necessary to obtain review be
available to indigents at state expense as readily as they were available to those who
could pay for them. It follows in right to treatment analysis that, although the state
has no naked obligation to provide treatment, once the legislature appropriates money
to construct mental hospitals and establishes procedures that commit people to those
institutions against their will, courts can compel the legislature to provide minimum
appropriations sufficient to ensure adequate treatment.
156. 309 F. Supp. at 385.
157. The plaintiffs in the third Wyatt case had requested that necessary funds be
raised by ordering the Mental Health Board to sell its land holdings and by enjoining
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The general scheme of desegregation cases taken with Holt v.
Sarver supports the legitimacy of Judge Johnson's action in Wyatt v.
Stickney. Nonetheless, there are limits on the extent to which such
intervention may properly and realistically extend. In upholding the
imposition of a court-created school desegregation plan on the ground
that the school authorities had reneged on their affirmative obligation
to convert to a unitary school system, the Supreme Court, in Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,6 8 attempted to define
limitations on the court's role by noting:
In seeking to define even in broad and general terms how
far this remedial power extends it is important to remember that
judicial powers may be exercised only on the basis of a constitu-
tional violation. Remedial judicial authority does not put judges
automatically in the shoes of school authorities whose powers
are plenary. Judicial authority enters only when local authority
defaults.Y9
Similarly, in Holt the court's decree admittedly was designed to
implement only the "minimum requirements" of a prison system.160
Analogizing from the accepted role of the judiciary in school de-
segregation and prison reform to its role in implementing the right
to treatment, it appears that if the state authorities desire to maintain
mental hospitals at all, the judiciary can compel the authorities to
maintain them in a constitutional fashion. The judicial branch can
lawfully intervene only to the extent necessary to remedy constitutional
violations. Consequently, a court cannot require that the best treatment
be given; due process requires no more than minimal adequate
treatment.
Generally, when the question of judicial intervention arises, an
administrative body is given the opportunity to eradicate those condi-
tions that resulted in a denial of constitutional rights. In Green v.
County School Board,'61 the Supreme Court declared that its decision
in the second Brown v. Board of Education case'6 2 placed an affirmative
duty on recalcitrant local school boards to provide plans that would dis-
band dual school systems. The district court in Holt decided to allow
the state treasurer and comptroller from expending state funds on nonessential state
functions.
158. 402 US. 1 (1971).
159. Id. at 16.
160. 309 F. Supp. at 383.
161. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Accord, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1 (1971).
162. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
1972]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the Commissioner of Corrections an opportunity to come forward with a
plan eliminating cruel and unusual punishment in the state prisons prior
to its consideration of other remedies. This decision, in contrast to the
school desegregation cases, was based on the good faith the state had
exhibited in ameliorating prison conditions prior to the Holt decision.'63
Future decrees designed to remedy inadequate treatment being
delivered in public hospitals will probably be guided by the equitable
principles set out in school desegregation cases. The problems inherent
in effectuating a unitary school system are similar to the complex
problems of upgrading public mental hospitals. First, as in school
desegregation, courts dealing with the right to treatment have no
expertise and, therefore, will have to depend on the cooperation of
local officials and government agencies such as the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare. Second, no one plan can remedy all
the inadequacies; each case will have to be "assessed in light of the
circumstances present and the options available in each instance.""'
In the language of the second Brown decision, the courts will have to
be governed by equitable principles characterized by flexibility in the
fashioning of remedies and by reconciling "public and private needs."'65
Like the decree in Wyatt, an appropriate remedy must necessarily
recognize that adequate treatment cannot be provided overnight. Third,
judicial scrutiny of plans submitted by local health authorities in re-
sponse to a decree should follow the guidelines announced in Green v.
County School Board when deciding whether the proposed program of
treatment is adequate: "the availability to the board of other more prom-
ising courses of action may indicate a lack of good faith; and at the least
it places a heavy burden upon the board to explain its preference for
an apparently less effective method."' 66 Whether local authorities are
given time in addition to that stipulated in the original decree may
well depend on good faith implementation. In Watson v. City of
Memphis,'67 for example, the city was denied the additional time that
it argued was necessary to desegregate the public parks partly on the
grounds that the city had delayed nine years since the first Brown
v. Board of Education decision.
In contrast to the Arkansas legislature, the Alabama legislature
in the aftermath of Wyatt v. Stickney has encountered serious political
163. The Holt court noted that Arkansas had conducted studies investigating the
prison system, that new legislation had been proposed for the benefit of the Penitentiary
and that the legislature had appropriated increased funds. 309 F. Supp. at 383.
164. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
165. 349 U.S. at 300.
166. 391 U.S. at 439.
167. 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
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difficulties in attempting to comply with the court's order. 168 As the
eighteen-year battle to implement Brown v. Board of Education has
demonstrated, hostile public officials can do much to frustrate basic
and constitutionally required reform, whether it be in public schools
or mental hospitals. Formidable as the hurdle may be, political opposi-
tion is not a consideration properly before the court, nor is it an
excuse for judicial timidity. The Constitution provides no barrier to
a court order mandating greater legislative concern, nor do principles
of equity.
IV. CONCLUSION
Wyatt v. Stickney may signal the end of the era of bare recog-
nition of the right to treatment and the inauguration of its effective
enforcement. The Wyatt court, by framing its decree in the now
familiar language of a school desegregation order, may have given
the judiciary a viable weapon for compelling public officials to give
more than custodial care to individuals committed for treatment pur-
poses. Whether a court would order a remedy fashioned like the one
in Wyatt if conditions at the hospital in question were less offensive
than those at Bryce is uncertain. And, unfortunately, the availability
of an effective enforcement mechanism solves only a few of the count-
less problems delaying widespread realization of the right to treatment.
Judges will still have to formulate and apply admittedly awkward
standards. In addition, many patients are unaware of their rights - due
in part to their mental condition and in part to the fact that hospital
officials do not apprise them of their rights. Even when aware, many
are unable to obtain counsel.' 9 The judiciary still has to face the
crucial issues involved with non-dangerous and dangerous persons who
either refuse treatment or are untreatable. Finally, without accompany-
ing public concern, the type of decree issued in Wyatt will become a
futile exercise in legal scholarship, for in the last analysis it falls to
the legislatures, prompted by public concern, to ensure that those who
are ordered to sacrifice their freedom to obtain therapeutic care in
fact receive it.
168. The state's attempt to provide the additional mental health appropriations
required by the court order was characterized by a war of nerves between the Governor
and the state legislature; the Governor proposed to divert $24,000,000 from the teacher
retirement fund, but the legislature would only agree to a new tax plan earmarked
for mental health financing which the Governor threatened to veto. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 14, 1971, § 1, at 55, col. 1.
169. Comment, Compulsory Commitment: The Rights of the Incarcerated Mentally
Ill, DUKE L.J. 677, 699 (1969).
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